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There might have been a consensus that no-fault accident compensation
would be superior to the erstwhile liability system, but the actual process
of enacting workers' compensation involved a complex set of political ne-
gotiations both across and within various interest groups and within state
legislatures. Because the specifics of the legislationincluding benefit lev-
els, state versus private insurance, the administration of the law, the cov-
erage of industries, and the rights of workers to negligence suitsde-
termined how income would be distributed under the new law, reaching
compromises on these details were sometimes acrimonious events. In this
chapter we use several brief case studies to illuminate how various eco-
nomic interests were filtered through the political process to shape work-
ers' compensation legislation.'
Interest groups typically wrote bills that best expressed politically what
they desired; therefore, the bills that were debated within state legislatures
were often quite diverse. As would be expected, fights developed between
interest groups over the specific features the workers' compensation law
would contain. If the groups were far apart the disagreements could delay
the process of adoptionby two years in Minnesota and over fifteen years
in Missouri, for example. Such delays are consistent with Howitt and Win-
trobe's (1995) theoretical prediction that beneficial policies may not even
be brought up for legislative consideration because each group fears that
it may end up with its opponent's version of the legislation.
The factions that made up broad interest groupsorganized labor, em-
ployers, or attorneysdid not all share the same views regarding the
proper means to achieve better workplace accident compensation in the
early twentieth century. In Minnesota and Missouri, for instance, specific
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unions took opposing sides on the passage of workers' compensation. This
fight within the union ranks was not really over the general issue of work-
ers' compensation but over the optimal strategy that unions should em-
ploy to secure a law that was closest to their ideal. Typically, one faction
believed that in order to secure the enactment of workers' compensation
unions had to settle for a basic law without state insurance and relatively
low accident benefits. The goal then was to later amend the bill to shape
the law more in their favor. Another faction argued that the optimal strat-
egy was to seek what organized labor wanted most when workers' com-
pensation was first introduced because amending the bill later would be
more difficult. These internal struggles show that strategic political ma-
neuvering can distort how analysts view an interest group's preferences if
we take their support for specific legislation at face value. In addition, it
is also important to look at the group's expectations of their future suc-
cesses in influencing the political process.
The case studies allow us to examine more carefully how political nu-
ances influenced the timing and nature of compensation legislation in the
191 Os. Employers, organized labor, insurers, and trial lawyers often had
far greater power in legislatures than their numbers would suggest. These
groups often framed the public and legislative debates, offered information
to legislators, flooded hearings with their witnesses, and generally exerted
substantial influence in the legislatures as proposals moved from the em-
ployers' liability commission through the House, the Senate, and the gov-
ernor's office, sometimes to a referendum. In many states multiple propos-
als came out of the employers' liability commission. Legislators favoring
specific bills worked hard to get their favored bills sent to the committees
where their allies held sway. Within the committees, compromises were
struck, but such compromises were overturned by intricate legislative ma-
neuvers on the floor and battles across chambers. Since at each stage the
relative political strength of the different interest groups varied, proposals
that carried the day in the House might have faced severe obstacles in the
Senate, or faced a governor's veto. In a few states the legislature's decision
was then subject to a popular referendum, which sometimes led to compli-
cated strategic moves inside the legislature in anticipation of the referen-
dum. In Missouri, for example, some opponents of workers' compensation
voted for union-sponsored amendments to the workers' compensation
bill, in anticipation that a more extreme bill would be struck down in the
voter referendum. In other states, like New York, the legislation was struck
down by the courts as unconstitutional, necessitating a major rewrite of
the bill or a constitutional amendment. A closer examination of the adop-
tion process in a variety of states highlights the nuances of the political
process that shaped workers' compensation laws.122Chapter 5
5.1Ohio
The adoption process in Ohio illustrates several features that were com-
mon to many states. An employers' liability commission was established
with balanced representation between organized labor and employers' rep-
resentatives. Although a majority struck a compromise within the com-
mission, organized labor's discontent with the compromise bill then led to
two versions of the legislation being sent to the legislature. While the fac-
tions in the House maneuvered the two bills through the committee struc-
ture, labor supporters rammed their ideal bill through the Senate. Ohio's
governor then exercised his veto threat to craft a compromise that was
suitable to all sides.2
As part of the political compromise in the passage of the Norris Em-
ployer Liability Act of 1910, the Ohio legislature established an Employ-
ers' Liability Commission (ELC). As in many other states, the commission
included an equal number of employers and labor representatives. The
Ohio ELC consisted of five members: W. J. Rohr and W. J. Winans were
the labor representatives, George Perks and John Smith represented em-
ployers, and J. Harrington Boyd was the nonaligned chair of the commis-
sion. The ELC was charged with proposing a bill for consideration by the
1911 legislature. Three main issues became points of contention. The first
stumbling block was the issue of how the cost of workers' compensation
was to be shared by employers and workers. While in most states there
was intense debate over the percentage of wages to be replaced or the max-
imum weekly benefit, Ohio union officials and employers focused more
critically on who would pay the workers' compensation insurance premi-
ums. The second major issue centered on whether a worker, after his acci-
dent occurred, would have the right to choose between the guaranteed
workers' compensation benefits or suing his employer under negligence
liability. Workers wanted the right to choose because if they could prove
the employer's negligence, then they could perhaps receive full compensa-
tion for their injuries in a court award or settlement. If such a case could
not be made, then the worker had the option of selecting the statutory
amount of workers' compensation benefits. Employers strongly opposed
giving workers this option because it would confront them with the same
legal and financial uncertainty from which they were trying to escape. If
workers could choose their means of compensation, then employers would
be forced to pay damages to all of their injured workers, plus they would
still face the possibility of paying very large awards to those workers with
strong negligence claims. Thus, under such a legal regime, employers
would have gained nothingtheir accident costs would have risen and
the uncertainty of their payouts would have remained intact. The third
issue, and the one that in the years following the adoption of workers'
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was the choice between state and private insurance of workers' compensa-
tion risk.
The internal discussions within the ELC foreshadowed the debate to
follow in the 1911 legislature. By a four-to-one majority, the commission
settled on proposing a compromise bill to the legislature. The commis-
sion's bill called for the creation of a state insurance fund and the elimin-
ation of private insurance of workers' compensation, which was very sat-
isfactory from the point of view of the Ohio State Federation of Labor
(OSFL). Employers were able to secure their own favored provision, how-
everthe ability to pass 25 percent of their compensation insurance pre-
miums onto workers. Further, if a firm joined the state fund, then its work-
ers were automatically enrolled in the system and thus lost their rights to
sue for damages under the common law. Employers, particularly the Ohio
Manufacturers' Association (OMA), which had formed in November 1910
specifically to address the issues surrounding workplace liability, strongly
supported this workers' compensation proposal.3 Since this bill was to
draw the most support from employers, we will henceforth refer to it as
the "employer" bill.
The OSFL, while pleased with the state fund proposal included in the
majority bill, was deeply disappointed with the remainder of the ELC's
bill. They repudiated one of their own representatives to the ELC, W J.
Rohr, for joining the majority after promising his colleague W J. Winans
that he would not.4 To ensure that the OSFL stance would be included in
the official report of the ELC, Winans submitted a minority report that
contained a workers' compensation bill that would have required employ-
ers to pay 100 percent of their insurance premiums and would have given
workers the option of choosing, after their injury had occurred, between
workers' compensation benefits and a negligence suit. We refer below to
this bill as the "labor" bill.
In the 1911 Ohio legislature a bitter battle developed over the employer
and labor bills coming out of the ELC. Employers, organized labor, and
insurers lobbied a legislature that included substantially more progressive
reformers than the 1910 special session of the legislature. The Democrats
had captured a majority in both chambers and progressives from both
parties held 47 percent of the House seats and 32 percent of the Senate
seats.5 In the House the labor bill was shepherded to the Corporations
Committee, chaired by labor supporter George Nye, which reported the
bill out of committee favorably, but, in the words of the OMA, "without
giving the matter any consideration whatever."6 At the same time, the em-
ployer bill was sent to the Judiciary Committee, which amended the bill
and reported it out of committee without a recommendation. The OMA
worried that the OSFL had enough votes to pass the minority bill. Yet the
OMA held a trump card because "if the bill had...become law it would
have had not the least effect, because no employer in Ohio would have124Chapter 5
insured under it, and the labor leaders and their allies knew this to be
a fact."7
When the labor bill came up for a vote in the House, the allies of the
OMA succeeded in sending both of the ELC's workers' compensation bills
to a special committee. Shortly after the House special committee was
announced, the political maneuvering in the House became moot. Sen-
ate leader William Green, later president of the American Federation of
Labor (AFL), shepherded the labor bill through the Senate by a vote
of twenty-six to one with only one amendment, which prevented workers
from collecting workers' compensation benefits if they chose to sue under
the common law.8 As the House special committee considered the Senate
versions of the labor bill and the employer bill, the insurance lobby, op-
erating through the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, offered up its own
workers' compensation bill without state insurance. Despite insurers'
claims that a state fund would encourage negligent behavior and increase
the level of accidents, their efforts were fruitless because the ELC's em-
ployer and labor bills had set the agenda. Hence, state insurance was taken
off the table and the focus of the legislative debate was on the share of
premiums that employers and workers would pay and on a worker's right
to sue for damages.9 As shown in chapter 6, however, the state insurance
issue was hotly contested for several years following the passage of work-
ers' compensation in Ohio.
At this stage Governor Judson Harmon exercised the threat of his veto
power, announcing that he favored the employer bill and would veto the
labor bill if it were to pass. 10 Harmon, a former judge, then worked closely
with the House special committee to craft a compromise that would avoid
the constitutional problems highlighted by the New York Supreme Court's
Ives decision that struck down New York's 1910 compulsory workers'
compensation law (see section 5.4). Harmon and the committee wanted
to construct a law that was elective technically, but in practice encouraged
employers to join the state insurance fund. Their revision penalized em-
ployers by stripping them of their three legal defenses if they refused to
join the state fund. On the other hand, employers that elected to join the
state fund were rewarded in that their workers were prevented from filing
negligence suits unless the employer had failed to observe laws requiring
the safeguarding of machinery or had caused the worker's injury through
a willful act.1' The special committee also compromised on the percentage
of insurance premiums each party would pay. They proposed that employ-
ers pay 90 percent of the premiums, workers 10 percent.
When the compromise bill reached the House floor on 26 April 1911,
the battle over the two key issues intensified. Republican representative
Charles Reid offered an amendment to raise the workers' burden to 20
percent, but it was defeated seventeen to seventy-four, as legislators with
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progressive representative W. B. Kilpatrick unsuccessfully tried the reverse
strategy, calling for an amendment that would have required employers to
pay 100 percent of the premiums. The conservative Reid also sought to
amend the compromise bill by allowing employers to keep their three de-
fenses in liability suits even if they did not join the state fund. The amend-
ment struck at the very heart of Governor Harmon's attempts to entice
employers to join the workers' compensation fund. According to the Cleve-
land Plain Dealer, farmers enthusiastically supported Reid's amendment.'2
As in other states, farm interests were strongly opposed to being included
in the workers' compensation scheme and the farm lobby in Ohio was
deeply worried that the proposed legislation had not yet excluded them
from the law's purview.
Although Reid's amendment lost, legislators attempted to appease ag-
ricultural interests and small manufacturers. Special committee chairman
Ratliff then amended the bill to exempt employers with fewer than five
workers, which became a common provision in most states' laws. Repre-
sentative Gebhart further appealed to agricultural interests by offering an
amendment excluding agricultural workers and domestic servants, which
was adopted without a vote. However, on the afternoon that the final vote
was taken, Attorney General Timothy Hogan advised the legislature that
the amendment excluding agriculture would make the law unconstitu-
tional, and the House rescinded the amendment. The final bill, largely un-
changed from the special committee's compromise, easily passed the
House in a vote of eighty-three to eighteen. It was then signed into law by
Governor Harmon.
While the OMA considered the new law "probably the best law on this
subject in the United States today," the association expressed some reser-
vations. As can be seen in table 3.1, Ohio's benefits were relatively generous
when compared to other states'. Employers felt that increasing their share
of the workers' compensation premiums from 75 percent to 90 percent
might have made the difference between success and failure of the new
law. Of course, no one would know for sure until the state fund formulated
its rates.'3 The Ohio State Board of Liability Awards, the new state bureau-
cracy created to administer the state's workers' compensation insurance
fund, was well aware of this concern. H. R. Mengert claimed that since
Ohio's general revenues paid the administrative expenses of the state fund,
its workers' compensation rates were below private insurers' employers'
liability rates.'4 Indeed, within the next few years, employers agreed to pay
100 percent of the workers' compensation premiums.
5.2Illinois
The Illinois legislature flirted with a voluntary workers' compensation
bill in 1907 before striking it down at the behest of organized labor.'5 By126Chapter 5
1910, however, employers' groups and the state federation of labor began
pressing for workers' compensation. The Illinois adoption process illus-
trates the diversity of attitudes that at times developed within the orga-
nized labor lobby. Some unions favored workers' compensation while oth-
ers still sought an expansion of employers' liability instead. As a result, the
labor organizations offered competing bills to the legislature. The Illinois
experience was also one in which the governor's veto was extremely impor-
tant. The legislature gave the governor the final choice, as the legislature
passed both the workers' compensation bill and an employers' liability
bill. To the chagrin of the labor groups that preferred expanded employers'
liability, the governor signed the workers' compensation bill into law.
Throughout the period prior to the adoption of workers' compensation,
the Illinois Federation of Labor (IFL) pressed for employer liability laws.16
Employers meanwhile had begun to press for a voluntary system of private
insurance. The 1905 legislature established a commission to examine the
accident problem and in 1907 it submitted a proposal to establish a volun-
tary but comprehensive system of private insurance for workplace injuries.
The standard plan was for a 50 percent replacement rate for disability and
a death benefit equal to the larger of three years' income or one thousand
dollars. Employers, however, would pay only half of the premium. Orga-
nized labor strongly opposed the plan in the 1907 legislature and instead
focused their attention on trying to further expand liability.
Like many other states, Illinois established a commission in 1910 to
examine the compensation of workplace accidents and to propose a leg-
islative solution. The commission was balanced with six labor represen-
tatives and six employers. While employers and organized labor worked
to reach a middle ground on their differences, deep divisions developed
within the labor movement. The IFL, with strong internal support from
the miners' union, strongly favored workers' compensation. In contrast,
the Chicago Federation of Labor (CFL) and the Railway Trainmen's
Union (RTU) wanted to modify the negligence system by eliminating the
three defenses. They argued that workers' compensation benefits were
meager relative to the high awards that could be received under expanded
liability, and that expanding employers' liability would force employers to
increase their accident prevention activities.
As the workers' compensation commission began to develop a compro-
mise bill, the three CFL representatives on the commission expressed their
dissatisfaction with the process and resigned. Governor Charles S. De-
neen, a progressive Republican who endorsed workers' compensation,
replaced the walkouts with three IFL representatives and the commis-
sion sent forward a bill similar to the model bill proposed by the National
Association of Manufacturers. The bill offered expected benefits amount-
ing to 1.48 percent of average annual income, which was near the lower
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countered by having representatives introduce an alternative bill to elimi-
nate the three defenses in the 1911 legislature. They then ordered their
lobbyists not to waste any time on workers' compensation.
The 1911 legislature passed both the commission's workers' compen-
sation bill and the CFL's liability bill, which led to further jockeying
for position on all sides. The Illinois Manufacturers Association (IMA),
which was a supporter of workers' compensation, thought the benefit lev-
els were too high, so it urged the governor to veto both bills and then
reexamine the workers' compensation bill. The insurance companies also
favored workers' compensation on the grounds that expanding employers'
liability would make it "manifestly impossible to fix the rates with any
certainty," while workers' compensation awards would be more easily pre-
dictable (Castrovinci 1976, 89). Although the CFL still opposed workers'
compensation, in May 1911 it eventually agreed not to oppose the legisla-
tion in exchange for a promise from friends of the governor and his allies
that their liability bill would also pass. The governor, however, vetoed the
CFL liability bill and signed only the workers' compensation bill because
this was the wish of the majority of the compensation commission mem-
bers. The CFL evidently recovered from this political setback because in
1913 it was actively participating in the process to amend the workers'
compensation law to make it more beneficial to injured workers.
5.3Massachusetts
Massachusetts enacted a workers' compensation law relatively early, as
leading employers and organized labor all called for its adoption. These
groups overcame efforts to delay the legislation and adopted a compro-
mise measure that offered about average benefits among the early adopt-
ers. An attempt by organized labor to eliminate casualty insurance of
workers' compensation passed the lower branch of the legislature, but in-
surance companies effectively fought back in the Senate, so that employers
had the option of casualty as well as mutual insurance in the final compro-
mise version of the bill.
In 1908 Massachusetts established opportunities for workers and em-
ployers to sign ex ante contracts that seemed to capture the essence of the
workers' compensation idea. The benefit levels were to be decided by the
state board of arbitration and conciliation in Massachusetts, but the ad-
ministrative costs to workers and employers of submitting contracts for
approval were onerous. The Massachusetts Commission for the Compen-
sation for Industrial Accidents (1912, 14-17) found that no one submitted
contracts for approval in Massachusetts because the one-year limit on
contract duration "rendered it undesirable for employers to formulate
plans and to incur the trouble and expense necessary to operate them."
By 1910 there was widespread interest in workers' compensation in128Chapter 5
Massachusetts. The New England Civic Federation, the Boston Chamber
of Commerce's Committee on Industrial Relations, and the Massachusetts
State Branch of the AFL (MSBAFL) all expressed interest in enacting a
workers' compensation bill)7 They were worried about the gap between
what employers were paying in premiums and what workers actually re-
ceived and the increasing presence of bad feelings between employers and
employees. As in other states, however, there was disagreement about the
specifics of the legislation. The Boston Chamber's Committee on Indus-
trial Relations drafted its own bill, as did the MSBAFL. Asher (1969)
claims that there was substantial disagreement across unions about the
precise nature of the bill. Pressure from both the Boston Chamber of
Commerce and organized labor forced the legislature to establish a com-
mission to report a bill to the 1911 legislature.'8
In the commission's hearings the chairman stated that only one in fif-
teen injured employees received any reasonable award and that employers
and employees were unanimously dissatisfied with the current system.
They drafted a bill that offered benefits that were in the mid-range of ben-
efits for early adopting states: benefits of 50 percent of the wage, with a
minimum of four dollars and a maximum of ten dollars per week, a two-
week waiting period, and a death benefit of three hundred times the
weekly payment. Labor leaders uniformly approved the bill, although they
expressed minor dissatisfaction with the two-week waiting period. Em-
ployers objected to specific features of the bill. Some still sought contribu-
tory negligence, while small employers in risky industries worried about
the cost of the system and employers in low-risk industries sought to re-
duce the waiting time to allow some of their workers to obtain benefits for
their injuries.
In January 1911 the commission argued in favor of postponing legisla-
tive consideration of the bill, but Governor and former manufacturer Eu-
gene Foss, the Boston Chamber of Commerce, and organized labor ac-
tively pushed for passage of some form of legislation. The major battles
fought over the legislation centered on the issue of state insurance, as three
bills were sent to the legislature in February 1911. The bill that commis-
sion chairman Lowell proposed allowed employers to join a mutual insur-
ance fund or to self-insure. A second bill written by Magnus Alexander
proposed mutual insurance, whereby both workers and employers contrib-
uted. Organized labor disliked this option and proposed through represen-
tatives Saunders and Parks to establish a single mutual insurance com-
pany, the Massachusetts Employers Insurance Association (now Liberty
Mutual), which would operate privately after receiving some initial financ-
ing from the state. All three bills barred casualty insurance. After several
hearings a joint Senate-House committee endorsed the Saunders-Parks
bill in the House. The bill passed the House on July 10 without a re-
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In the Senate the bill met with strong opposition from "cautious" sena-
tors and an effective insurance lobby. In a seventeen-to-sixteen vote the
Senate refused to table the bill. Senators under pressure from the casualty
insurance lobby amended the bill by a vote of twenty-nine to nine, al-
lowing employers to insure with any stock or mutual insurance company,
despite strong opposition to the amendment from labor unions. Asher
(1969, 471-72) claims that the insurance lobby would have blocked any
further action if the amendment had not been included. After the Ives case
in 1911 had declared New York's 1910 hazardous workers' compensation
bill unconstitutional, legislatures were sensitive to the courts' treatment of
workers' compensation legislation. The legislature stayed in session long
enough to receive the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's favorable
opinion on the bill.
Asher (1969) claims that the 1911 Massachusetts legislature enacted
more labor legislation than in any previous period, including an eight-
hour act for public employees, a fifty-four-hour law for women and mi-
nors, and a moderate anti-injunction law. Organized labor, in tandem with
the relatively progressive legislature, was able to reach a compromise with
employers so that the workers' compensation law would offer about the
average benefits for the period. On the other hand, labor's attempts to
eliminate casualty insurance were overcome by a relatively strong insur-
ance lobby.
5.4New York and the Role of the Courts
Robert Wesser (1971) and Robert Asher (1971) show that the process
of adopting workers' compensation in New York involved political in-
fighting and compromise both within and across interest groups. Such a
finding is common for most states, so rather than summarize their discus-
sions here, we focus our attention on the role the New York Court of Ap-
peals played in influencing workers' compensation across the nation.
New York led the way for broad-based workers' compensation laws. In
1910, after substantial debate, New York adopted two versions of workers'
compensation: a compulsory law for extrahazardous occupations and a
voluntary law for all firms. In January 1911 a lower court decision had
supported the constitutionality of the compulsory law. On 23 March 1911,
however, New York's highest court unanimously declared the compulsory
law for hazardous employment to be unconstitutional in Ives v. South
Buffalo Ry. Co. (124 N.YS. 920 [1911]). The court held that "compulsory
compensation for all injuries, regardless of fault, imposed on employers a
'liability unknown to the common law,' which 'constituted a deprivation
of liberty and property' under the due process clauses of the New York
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment" (Asher 1971, 361; see also
U.S. Bureau of Labor 1911, 110).130Chapter 5
New York still had the voluntary law in place after the court decision.
Workers and employers could sign workers' compensation contracts with
benefit levels similar to those established under the compulsory law. Few
employers and workers seemed interested in the voluntary law, however,
partly because there were high costs to registering the contracts and partly
because they anticipated that a compulsory law might soon be enacted.
By July 1913 only one firm had consented to a voluntary agreement and
only 38 of their 440 employees had signed contracts. The administrative
costs of setting up the voluntary contracts were prohibitive because the
employer and each employee had to sign and submit written agreements
to the county clerk, which was a far more cumbersome system than the
standard methods of election in later workers' compensation laws (Clark
1914, 116-17).
The supporters of workers' compensation focused their efforts on ob-
taining a constitutional amendment to allow a compulsory workers' com-
pensation law. They tried to pass an amendment in 1911 after the Ives
decision was announced, but with the limited time available the various
supporters could not agree on an amendment before the end of the ses-
sion. By 1912, the leading labor, employer, and insurance groups were
pressing for a constitutional amendment. Five bills were proposed to the
legislature. The New York State Federation of Labor (NYSFL) pressed
for an amendment that would have required employers to insure through a
state fund and that would have also established state old-age and sickness
insurance plans. Insurers, the New York Manufacturers' Association, and
other employers, in contrast, pressed for the Bayne-Phillips compromise
amendment, which would allow the state to make workers' compensation
compulsory but did not require employers to insure with a state fund. The
New York Association for Labor Legislation (NYALL) decided not to
support the NYSFL amendment because they believed that an amend-
ment requiring state insurance and old-age and health insurance would
not be supported by the electorate. The Bayne-Phillips amendment passed
the legislature in 1912 and in 1913 and was overwhelmingly approved by
the electorate in fall of 1913 (Asher 1971, 565).
Throughout 1913 there had been substantial debates about other details
relating to workers' compensation. As in other states, labor pressed for
state insurance and high benefits, while employers and insurers pressed for
lower benefits and the inclusion of private insurers in the system. An at-
tempt at a compromise during May's regular session failed. Finally, after
the compulsory amendment was passed in fall 1913, a special session was
called. Democrats who had lost their majority for the upcoming legislature
wanted to insure the passage of workers' compensation. Governor Martin
Glynn strongly supported the more liberal workers' compensation, and
the NYSFL and the NYALL had decided that it was futile to bar the
insurance companies from the system. As a result, the compromise legisla-The Political Process of Adopting Workers' Compensation 131
tion with high benefits and allowing for both state and private insurance
was passed in December 1913 (Asher 1971, 565-93).
Although the Ives decision slowed the ultimate adoption of a compul-
sory law in New York, it did not slow the adoption of workers' compen-
sation in most other states. The decision in the case was handed down in
the middle of the legislative sessions for a number of states that adopted
workers' compensation in 1911. After Ives, Washington went ahead and
adopted its own compulsory workers' compensation law, which the Wash-
ington Supreme Court later declared constitutional on the grounds that
the law was a reasonable regulation that corrected an existing "evil" (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics 1913b, 78). In Massachusetts the 1911 legisla-
ture submitted the bill to the supreme court for a ruling before passing it
(ibid., 76). The solution to the problem in the vast majority of states was
the same as that followed by the Ohio legislature, described above. Most
states altered the proposed workers' compensation bill to allow employers
to choose whether to join the workers' compensation system. Those that
did not elect workers' compensation, however, gave up the assumption of
risk, fellow servant, and contributory negligence defenses in negligence
liability suits. States like Ohio and California later adopted constitutional
amendments that allowed them to move from elective to compulsory
statutes.
5.5Minnesota
In Minnesota there was early agreement among employers, workers,
and lawyers on support for workers' compensation. However, disagree-
ments between the interest groups over the details of the legislation led
Minnesota's employers' liability commission to follow other states in pro-
posing multiple bills to the legislature. The disagreements across interest
groups were matched by disagreements among the factions within each
interest group. The internal disagreements slowed the adoption of work-
ers' compensation by two years. Within the labor movement the battle was
over whether to try to obtain labor's optimal bill on the first try, or to
try to establish the principle of workers' compensation and then work on
amending the key features later. After extensive legislative struggles, the
Minnesota State Federation of Labor (MnSFL) followed the latter strat-
egy. They agreed to support a bill that favored employers, on the grounds
that it was important to obtain workers' compensation. They then pro-
ceeded to press for amendments over the next decade. 19
By 1909 workers, employers, and lawyers began to unite in their efforts
to adopt workers' compensation legislation. In December 1908 a group of
eleven employers met to form the Minnesota Employers' Association
(MEA) because of the increased threat of their losing the common law
defenses in personal injury lawsuits.2° The MEA set a favorable tone for132Chapter 5
the coming debate, arguing that workers' compensation would provide
injured workers with quick remuneration without expensive litigation,
while keeping the employers' accident costs stable. The MEA suggested
that organized labor, the Minnesota State Bar Association (MSBA), and
employers join together in presenting a unified argument before the legis-
lature.
In January 1909 the central players in the effort to enact workers' com-
pensation met for five hours in the Commissioner of Labor's office to de-
cry the "inhuman method" of accident compensation that prevailed in
Minnesota.2' George M. Gillette, president of the MEA, William McEwen,
Minnesota's Commissioner of Labor and Secretary-Treasurer of the
MnSFL, representatives of various railroad brotherhoods, and Hugh
Mercer, the chairman of the MSBA's special committee on workers' com-
pensation, developed a united course of action during the meeting. They
filed a formal petition with Governor John A. Johnson, requesting him to
seek legislation to establish a nonpartisan, three-person commission to
investigate the employers' liability system and to present workers' com-
pensation proposals to the 1911 legislature.22 Gillette of the MEA and
McEwen of the MnSFL agreed that all efforts to secure workers' compen-
sation would be channeled through the proposed commission. McEwen
made a "gentleman's agreement" with Gillette that organized labor would
discontinue their efforts to amend the employers' liability laws. The
MnSFL's unambiguous goal was now workers' compensation.23
After some debate over who would select the three-man commission,
the 1909 legislature granted the governor's request for a commission and
legislation requiring employers to report industrial accidents to the De-
partment of Labor and Industries.24 The governor made the obvious
choice of William McEwen, George Gillette, and Hugh Mercer, who were
clearly the leaders of the workers' compensation movement in Minne-
sota.25 Translating their mutual dissatisfaction with the traditional negli-
gence system into a workable compensation system proved more difficult
than the three commission members had originally thought. The commis-
sion members' interests split, with labor leader McEwen and attorney
Mercer agreeing on one form of legislation while Gillette formulated his
own plan. Furthermore, whatever mutual respect McEwen and Gillette
had for one another at the beginning of the commission's work had by late
1910 become strained.26
Gillette refused to join the majority for three primary reasons. First, the
majority bill would have made workers' compensation compulsory for all
employers. Gillette (1911 a) argued that the compulsory feature of the law
was likely to be unconstitutional; therefore, he offered the same alternative
adopted in Ohio and many other states, making the law elective in fact,
but nearly compulsory in practice because any employer who opted out
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Second, the majority bill required employers to pay full medical coverage
for the first two weeks of injury, up to one hundred dollars. Gillette
claimed that no matter how minor the accident, hospitals and doctors
would prescribe treatment in order to extract the full one hundred dollar
benefit. Therefore, his bill specified that an employer was only required to
furnish "reasonable medical and surgical first aid." Third, Gillette sought
to reduce employers' insurance costs. His bill offered the same waiting pe-
riod, the same percentage of wage replacement, and the same time frame
for disbursement as the majority bill. However, he sought to cap an em-
ployer's liability for a single accident, like a mine explosion, at fifty thou-
sand dollars. To reduce employers' insurance costs, Gillette further recom-
mended that employees contribute 20 percent of the cost of the insurance,
not exceeding 1 percent of the workers' wages.27 With such widespread dis-
agreement among the interest groups that supposedly wanted workers'
compensation the most, the legislature failed to pass any compensation law
in the 1911 session.28
It was not only because of divisions among interest groups that workers'
compensation did not fare well in the 1911 legislature, but also because of
disagreements within the respective interest groups. On the employers'
side, the MEA decided not to support Gillette's version of the bill because
of "diversity of opinion on the subject."29 A similar split developed within
organized labor. McEwen discovered that his own advisory group of fifty
labor leaders was dissatisfied with the benefits in the bill that he and Mer-
cer had proposed.3° McEwen argued that the best strategy was to get some
form of workers' compensation and amend it later to obtain higher bene-
fits, but the MnSFL refused to support McEwen's bill unless the benefits
were raised. The railroad brotherhoods, in both 1911 and 1913, wanted
the negligence liability status quo since they were doing relatively well un-
der the common law.31 Yet another bill, pertaining to dangerous industries,
was proposed by organized labor's legal counsel, Minnesota Supreme
Court justice Thomas D. O'Brien. O'Brien's bill gave a worker the choice,
after a workplace injury had occurred, between accepting workers' com-
pensation or pursuing a negligence claim against his employer, who could
not invoke assumption of risk and fellow servant defenses and was allowed
only a modified version of the contributory negligence defense. 32 Employ-
ers ardently opposed this bill because, as we note in chapter 4, it defeated
one of the primary purposes for employer support of workers' compensa-
tion.33 They still would have to pay workers' compensation benefits to the
vast majority of injured workers, no matter who was at fault. Meanwhile,
they also would be forced to pay large sums to defend against the negli-
gence suits filed by workers who thought they could get higher benefits
through a negligence claim.
With such widespread disagreement among and within the key interest
groups, the legislature failed to pass any compensation law in the 1911134Chapter 5
session. By late 1912, however, employers and labor representatives had
agreed upon a course of action for the 1913 legislative session. The MEA
proposed a law that closely resembled New Jersey's law, which had been
enacted in 1911 and declared constitutional.34 The Bar Association contin-
ued its support of the commission's majority bill from 1911 which made
coverage compulsory, but organized labor was willing to join the employ-
ers in supporting the New Jersey law because it was seen as "a fair law
and guarantees adequate protection at the minimum of cost."35 Although
the New Jersey law was elective in nature, 90 to 95 percent of the employ-
ers were choosing the new system because if they refused the law, they
would have been stripped of their common law defenses in a negligence
suit.36
While employers and labor representatives had agreed on a bill'in prin-
ciple, several aspects of the bill that employers had written posed serious
threats to its passage. Various factions within organized labor adamantly
opposed four provisions: authorizing employers to pass 20 percent of the
insurance costs directly onto workers; a clause allowing for compensation
only if the worker was not "willfully negligent" at the time he was injured;
a lower set of benefits for the dependents of injured workers living outside
the United States; and a provision allowing benefits to be paid in a lump
sum without court supervision.37 Labor was also dissatisfied with the level
of benefits offered in the MEA-sponsored bill, suggesting instead that
maximum weekly benefits for death and permanent disability be increased
from ten to fifteen dollars, the length of benefits increased from 300 to 333
weeks, and the overall maximum benefit boosted from three thousand to
five thousand dollars.38
Internal conflicts within organized labor continued as the employers'
proposed law, which mimicked the low benefits from the New Jersey law
of 1911, worked its way through the 1913 legislature. While the MEA and
the MnSFL had essentially agreed to set aside their dispute with one an-
other in order to enact a workers' compensation law, a feud within the
labor movement grew more heated as the bill reached a final vote in the
Senate. The MnSFL and the St. Paul Trades and Labor Assembly
(SPTLA) took the position that in order for the principle of workers' com-
pensation to be introduced in Minnesota, sacrifices had to be made. With-
out compromising their principlessuch as having industry bear the de
jure full cost of the insurance and the removal of all notions of negli-
gencethe MnSFL was willing to accept lower benefits in the short term,
but with the full expectation of amending the law in future legislatures.39
The low benefits that the MnSFL was willing to accept, however, incited
calls that they were "selling out the cause of the workers to their employ-
ers."40 The two most vocal opponents of the compensation bill were the
railroad brotherhoods, who were concerned that the new law would pre-
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1908, and the Minneapolis Trades and Labor Assembly (MTLA).4' The
MTLA called the proposed bill the "most outrageous piece of legislation
attempted to be passed against the interests of the working people of the
state" and they "deplore[d] the fact that certain representatives of labor
seemed to be satisfied with anything the employers handed them."42 The
SPTLA scolded the MTLA for favoring the "upper class of workers" with
its attempt to secure very generous benefit levels immediately: "Shame on
such selfishness! If this is unionism and fraternity the less we have of it the
better." Like the MnSFL, the SPTLA believed that "half a loaf is better
than no bread at all."43
The marked-up bill that emerged from the Senate Labor Committee
eliminated farm labor and domestic servants from coverage, raised the
minimum weekly benefit from five to six dollars, guaranteed foreign and
domestic dependents the same schedule of benefits, eliminated any insur-
ance contributions by workers, and removed the "willful negligence"
clause. As a compromise, the MEA agreed to the minimum compensation
and worker contribution amendments, but not the others.44 Instead of
allowing the labor committee's amendments to delay the passage of work-
ers' compensation any further, however, the MEA decided to take no fur-
ther action to hinder the bill's progress in the legislature. Gillette finally
conceded that the Senate bill was "a satisfactory one and the best that
could be obtained."45
Despite the opposition of some labor groups, some employers, and "am-
bulance chasing lawyers," workers' compensation passed the Senate unani-
mously.46 As the bill moved to the House, "one of the most interesting
fights ever witnessed in the legislature" ensued.47 For six hours Representa-
tive Ernest Lundeen, a Republican and avid supporter of labor issues,
cheered on by labor representatives and socialists sitting in the gallery,
proposed a litany of labor-supported amendments that effectively served
as a filibuster.48 "Isn't it a travesty on justice to ask you to pass this mea-
sure ostensibly for the benefit of the workingmen but urged by the big
employers of the state?" Lundeen asked rhetorically.49 Lundeen and repre-
sentatives from districts that were more heavily unionized were able to
secure five amendments to the Senate's bill, but only two significantly
affected the compensation that workers would have received if injured:
(1) if workers were disabled for more than thirty days, they were to be
retroactively compensated for the first two weeks of not receiving benefits
because of the waiting period, and (2) an increase in the medical benefits
from $100 to $195. In fact, the House had rejected an amendment to raise
the medical benefits to $200, but in an effort to shutdown Lundeen's at-
tacks on the bill, labor leader McEwen was able to orchestrate support for
the $195 maximum. Two other important amendments failed to passan
increase in the weekly benefits from $10 to $15 and the exclusion of all
(not just interstate) railroad workers from coverage.50 The House passed136Chapter 5
the workers' compensation bill, with its amendments, by an overwhelming
102 to 6.'
The benefit levels established by Minnesota in 1913 were relatively low,
ranking near the bottom among the states that had adopted workers' com-
pensation by that year (see tables 3.1, B.lB.4). Because the law provided
such minimal benefits, the MTLA concluded that "the compensation law
really is a joke, if a pathetic one."52 McEwen admitted that the "new Work-
ingmen's Compensation law falls far short of our ideal... yet ...it was
the very best that could have been passed."53
Although the MnSFL (1913, 68) officials were pleased to finally estab-
lish workers' compensation as the first phase of their long-term strategy,
they soon began phase two. They sought and eventually succeeded in ob-
taining amendments to the law that would raise Minnesota's benefit levels
over the next few years.54 Meanwhile, they stated emphatically that "no
satisfactory solution to the question of workingmen's compensation can
be had except through the medium of state insurance."55 The debates over
state insurance are described more fully in the next chapter.
5.6Missouri
The sixteen-year struggle for the adoption of workers' compensation
in Missouri vividly illustrates the importance of political institutions to
the successful enactment of public policy. The referendum and initiative
mechanism that existed in Missouri created an additional institutional
hurdle that the workers' compensation law had to clear. Not only did the
relevant interest groups have to agree on a legislative outcome, but so did
the electorate. Thus, opponents of workers' compensation, anticipating
that whatever emerged from the legislature would have to meet the ap-
proval of voters, sought to saddle the legislative bills with amendments
that would undermine their chances of success in a referendum. The adop-
tion process in Missouri illustrates how the details of even very popular
legislation can be shaped by the political process. Finally, as in Minnesota,
disagreements internal to broad interest groups also contributed to the
delay in adoption of the law. In fact, the internal struggle within organized
labor over the details of workers' compensation in Minnesota pale in com-
parison with what happened in Missouri.56
The impetus for workers' compensation in Missouri came in 1910 when
the governor appointed a commission to investigate the workings of the
employers' liability system and the feasibility of a workers' compensation
law. The commission prepared an employers' liability measure for the 1911
session, which was subsequently killed in the House judiciary committee,
and requested that the legislature create its own investigative commission.
The General Assembly's 1911 commission, with the mandate to report a
bill to the 1913 legislature, included legislators from both chambers andThe Political Process of Adopting Workers' Compensation 137
citizens representing organized labor, manufacturing, insurance, and fi-
nancial interests. Since employer and labor representatives could not strike
a compromiselabor asking for unlimited benefits and state insurance
and employers asking for the exact oppositeno serious legislation was
introduced in 1913. The Senate therefore appointed another commission
that was to report to the 1915 legislature. The commission held months of
hearings and traveled to several states. In the end they proposed that Mis-
souri enact an elective workers' compensation act, establish an industrial
commission, provide for private mutual insurance, and impose a 5 percent
tax on insurance premiums to support the industrial commission (Mis-
souri Bureau of Labor Statistics [MBLSI 1918-1920, 206). Although the
Senate proposal received a favorable recommendation from the insurance
committee, the whole chamber never acted upon the bill. The Missouri
State Federation of Labor (MoSFL) and manufacturing interests could
agree that workers' compensation in principle was worth pursuing, but the
groups could not agree on the particulars of a law. The 1915 session ended
with no legislation because the parties disagreed on the levels of accident
payments, waiting periods, whether occupational disease should be cov-
ered, and organized labor's central goal, state insurance (MBLS 1918-
1920, 206).
After two legislative sessions without a compromise with employers,
Missouri's main unions began to split. In 1917 both the MoSFL and the
St. Louis Building Trades Council (SLBTC) presented separate bills be-
fore the legislature and a third measure presented by a group of employers
was "refuted by organized labor" (MBLS 1918-1920, 187). With divisions
deepening between organized labor and employers and within labor, the
session ended with the legislature far from a compromise compensation law.
Realizing that their efforts to adopt a workers' compensation law fa-
vorable to them were diminished if they did not present a united front,
the two major organized labor groups tried to reach a consensus at the
MoSFL's annual convention in 1918. After three days of negotiations with
no settlement, the MoSFL, the SLBTC, and the Kansas City Building
Trades Council (KCBTC) empowered a special compensation committee
to draft a bill for the 1919 legislature (MBLS 1918-1920, 188). The spe-
cial committee not only included representatives from the SLBTC, the
KCBTC, and the MoSFL, but also the Commissioner of the Missouri
Bureau of Labor Statistics William H. Lewis and his Supervisor of Statis-
tics A. T. Edmonston (MBLS 1918-1920, 188). What became known as
the "Labor Bill" contained organized labor's main objectives: a monopoly
state insurance fund and generous maximum benefits, in this case they
asked for no ceiling (MBLS 1918-1920, 204).
In 1919 the House passed an amended version of the Labor Bill, impos-
ing an eighteen-dollar weekly maximum, but keeping the state insurance
feature intact. The House bill was subsequently killed in the Senate Work-138Chapter 5
men's Compensation Committee and two efforts by senators sympathetic
to the MoSFL to place the bill on the calendar failed. The Senate then
passed its own bill (actually a committee substitute bill), which was later
adopted by the House and signed by the governor. The Senate bill was
much more amenable to employers' interests, placing a maximum of fif-
teen dollars on weekly benefits and eliminating public insurance.
MoSFL president R. T. Wood claimed that when the Senate bill arrived
in the House "if the bill had been amended by the dotting of an 'i' or the
crossing of a 't' it would have been killed by an adverse committee upon
its return to the Senate. The only possible chance to pass a compensation
law at this session was to pass the substitute through the House without
amendment." Wood reasoned that if state insurance and high benefits were
not politically feasible, then the goal should be to get the best workers'
compensation bill possible and to seek prolabor amendments in subse-
quent legislation. He assured the SLBTC and the KCBTC that "we
[M0SFL] stood by the building trades people in a last-ditch fight which
almost resulted in the defeat of all compensation measures by the Legisla-
ture. We could at any time have obtained the passage of a bill acceptable
to the other labor interests of the State, but we fought with the building
trades to the last. After the fight had failed and we began a last desperate
struggle to get compensation on the statutes, they deserted us instantly
and made an open fight on the floor of the House against the passage of
the Senate substitute. They were defeated and the bill was passed almost
unanimously."58
The building trades adhered to an all-or-nothing strategy, either work-
ers' compensation with state insurance and high maximum benefits or no
law at all. The building trades and some other union elements, in fact,
joined damage-suit attorneys, who clearly had an interest in striking down
workers' compensation, in circulating a petition to put the legislative act
before the voters in a November1920referendum.59 The strategy was suc-
cessful. Voters rejected the1919workers' compensation law by a close
52.2to 47.8 percent margin.60
By1921in Missouri, the MoSFL, the Associated Industries of Missouri
(AIM), and other employer organizations were cooperating for the pas-
sage of another workers' compensation law.61 The act that was ultimately
adopted had many similarities to the one enacted in1919,but it added a
state fund to compete with private insurance and raised the weekly maxi-
mum benefit from fifteen to twenty dollars. The damage-suit lawyers in
concert with the building trades councils again forced a referendum. Mis-
souri voters once again struck down workers' compensation by a comfort-
able margin,55.2to 44.8 percent. The lawyers also added an initiative to
the ballot that would have abolished the fellow servant defense, substi-
tuted comparative negligence for contributory negligence, and left assump-
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have repealed the 1921 legislative act if both measures passed in the
November 1922 referendum (MBLS 1921-4922, 936). Voters, however,
soundly defeated the lawyers' alternative (79.9 to 20.1 percent).
The inclusion of state insurance, which helped kill the law in the referen-
dum, was actually a last-minute floor amendment that was widely sup-
ported by opponents of workers' compensation. By 1921 legislators could
expect that any legislative act would be challenged in a referendum. Thus,
by saddling workers' compensation with state insurance, which voters op-
posed, the opponents hoped to ensure the law's defeat at the po11s. In an
analysis of the roll-call voting on the state insurance amendment in the
House of Representatives, we found that members of the Committee of
Commerce and Manufactories, which was dominated by agricultural in-
terests, and representatives whose districts supported the damage-suit at-
torneys' initiative were more likely to support the state insurance amend-
ment (see Kantor and Fishback 1994a, 288-91).
By 1923 the AIM was claiming that employers' liability was reaching a
crisis, with some insurance companies actually pulling out of Missouri.
Despite the impetus for workers' compensation, the General Assembly
failed to enact new workers' compensation legislation in the 1923 ses-
sion.63 Lindley Clark (1925, 602) reported in the Monthly Labor Review
that the chances of legislation were wrecked by organized labor's demands
for an exclusive state insurance system. Despite its losses in the legislature,
the MoSFL managed to put an initiative on the November 1924 ballot
that included organized labor's demands without compromise: an exclu-
sive state insurance fund and maximum weekly benefit levels of thirty dol-
lars, double the maximum benefits in neighboring Illinois and Kansas.64
The AIM and other industry groups actively opposed labor's proposal,
sending out two million pieces of literature and placing advertisements in
five hundred newspapers and magazines.65 Opponents urged support from
a wide range of interests. Since benefits were set so high, they argued that
manufacturers would leave St. Louis and Kansas City for neighboring
states.66 Since labor's proposal would have required firms with as few as
two employees to insure, AIM gained support from small business owners
who otherwise might not have been directly involved in workers' compen-
sation. Finally, and probably with most success, opponents appealed to
the taxpayer since organized labor proposed setting up an expensive com-
mission of five members with salaries of $6,000 each, creating a monopoly
state insurance fund, and appropriating more than $4 million to start it.67
Not surprisingly, the initiative was soundly defeated, 72.6 to 27.4 percent.
Organized labor's resounding defeat in 1924 and employers' increasing
urgency to adopt a workers' compensation law led to a compromise in the
1925 legislative session (Clark 1925, 602)68 The 1925 act was among the
more liberal laws at the time. No other state's accident benefits exceeded
the 1925 act's two-thirds of the wage, and its twenty dollars per week140Chapter 5
payment ceiling was higher than ceilings in neighboring Kansas and Illi-
nois. The generous benefit ceiling put Missouri fifth (tied with six others)
among all workers' compensation states, while its three-day waiting period
tied Missouri for third among the states (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
1926a, 23, 26). Without state insurance, the bill also gained support from
the insurance industry. The bill was designed to build a winning coalition
on other margins as well. The number of commissioners was cut, as were
their salaries, and public employees were covered under the law only if
individual municipalities decided so (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
1925b, 1329-30). Thus, the general public's worries about paying more
taxes for a larger bureaucracy or an insolvent state insurance fund were
assuaged. With these concerns addressed, the electorate supported work-
ers' compensation in Missouri by a more than two-to-one margin.
5.7Summary
Looking at the details of how workers' compensation was actually
adopted in a few representative states illustrates several common themes
that emerged in the cross-state quantitative comparisons in the previous
chapter. Employers, workers, and insurers all supported the general con-
cept of workers' compensation, but harsh debates developed over specific
features of the law. Employers and workers battled over the level of bene-
fits in the law and the issue of whether workers could retain the right to
choose to sue under negligence liability after they had been injured. As
will be shown in the next chapter, organized labor and insurers fought
harsh battles over the issue of state insurance of workers' compensation
risk, with employers taking both sides of the issue.
The case studies provide some general lessons about how public policy
is actually transformed from ideas into legislation. First, most legislation is
complex with multiple attributes, each of which might determine a group's
support or opposition to the bill. Because workers' compensation involved
a complex set of parameters, opposition to legislation was usually directed
at specific benefit levels or the choice between private and state insurance,
and not opposition to the general concept of switching to no-fault liability.
Although it is possible that interest groups might have disguised their op-
position to the general concept of workers' compensation in the form of
opposition to specific features of the bill, it seems unlikely that this was
true. In the vast majority of states, opposing interest groups compromised
relatively quickly in passing a workers' compensation law.
Second, the choices that state legislators made were framed by special
interest groups in ways that cannot be determined by just examining the
final version of the law. Lobbyists representing unions, employer groups,
or insurers offered their ideal bills to the states' liability commissions and
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served as an initial point in forthcoming legislative negotiations. It was the
legislators' task to then work out a series of compromises. The compro-
mises were determined in part by the political strength of the various inter-
est groups, but as the case studies illustrate, there were other more subtle
aspects of the legislative process that dictated the ultimate shape workers'
compensation would take.
Third, legislative institutions were extremely important in determining
how the law emerged from the political process. The membership of the
committee to which the bill was initially assigned determined not only
what type of bill would come out of the committee, but also more impor-
tantly whether the bill would be passed on for the whole chamber's consid-
eration. Both houses of the legislature and the governor all had veto power
over bills, which was important during the Progressive Era because one
chamber might have been more "progressive" than the other and willing
to pass legislation that more aggressively reformed workplace accident
compensation. For example, the Ohio Senate in 1911 and the Minnesota
House in the late 191 Os tended to be more supportive of the union's agenda
for workers' compensation, while in the other chambers employers and
insurers carried much more influence. The bills that were proposed by each
of the houses reflected their respective agendas, but in order for workers'
compensation to succeed politically a compromise was necessary between
the two chambers. In some cases the threat of a governor's veto kept legis-
lators on middle ground between the various interest groups. In Illinois, in
fact, the governor made the ultimate choice between expanding employers'
liability and establishing workers' compensation.
Fourth, although workers' compensation was widely supported because
of its anticipated benefits to a broad group of interests, sometimes disputes
between these very same interest groups over specific features of the legis-
lation caused delays in its adoption. Such a finding lends support to How-
itt and Wintrobe's (1995) prediction that socially beneficial legislation may
not even come up for legislative consideration because each side fears it
may get stuck with its opponent's favored policy. Thus, if interest groups'
initial proposals were meant as a starting point in the political negotia-
tions, these proposals may have seemed relatively "radical" and a fear that
the other side was unwilling to compromise may have caused either side
to push for a delay in the law's adoption. Such delays slowed the adoption
of workers' compensation by two years in Minnesota and by eight in Mis-
souri. The Missouri case is particularly unusual because even after the
interest groups were able to negotiate a compromise in the legislature in
1919 (after having begun the process in 1911), the need to satisfy the elec-
torate led to another set of delays that lasted another seven years.
Finally, the case studies caution against thinking that seemingly cohe-
sive interest groups have the same set of objectives. In Illinois, Minnesota,
and Missouri labor unions took opposing sides on the passage of workers'142Chapter 5
compensation even though all agreed that the overall idea behind the legis-
lation was an improvement on the status quo. Closer inspection shows that
the fight among unions was not truly over the general issue of workers'
compensation, but actually over the optimal strategy to secure the features
of the law that the unions most, desired. Typically, one group took the
stance that passing a basic bill without state insurance and lower benefits
was necessary to get workers' compensation enacted and then it would be
relatively easy to amend the bill to obtain the better benefits. The other
side argued that the optimal strategy was to seek every desired feature
when workers' compensation was first introduced on the grounds that
amending the law would be extremely difficult later. The case studies there-
fore show that in examining the positions of interest groups it is often not
enough to show that the new legislation is better than the status quo. It is
also important to look at the groups' estimates of the feasibility of amend-
ing the legislation later. The adoption of legislation only starts the process
of change in that public policy arena, as interest groups with a stake in
the legislation continue to apply pressure to shape the intricate details of
the law to fit their own demands. For example, when Minnesota enacted
its workers' compensation law in 1913, it was among the stingiest in terms
of accident benefits. Organized labor, however, was highly successful in
lobbying to increase the benefits through amendments of the law later in
the decade, and by 1921 the state was guaranteeing workers accident bene-
fits that were among the most generous in the country. Because the fea-
tures of the workers' compensation law were relatively controversial when
the legislation was first proposed, researchers must be cautious in ascrib-
ing success or failure to particular interest groups because the law took
one form or another. The initial version of the law was simply a starting
point for future political wrangling and compromise.
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Minnesota House of Representatives (1909, 20). Both Gillette and McEwen
gushed about their pathbreaking agreement. Testifying before the Labor Commit-
tee of the Minnesota House of Representatives in February 1909, Gillette boasted
that for "the first time in any state in the Union ... representatives of employers
and representatives of employes ... have come together and in calm, fair, dispas-
sionate discussion, have attempted to solve a problem which, to my mind, is the
most pressing problem before the people of Minnesota." McEwen was no less san-
guine: "For the first time in human history. .. the representatives of the employing
and the working classes met together in full, free and fair conference ... and came
to a harmonious and unanimous conclusion concerning what was the best thing
to do toward removing prevailing hardships and existing evils" in the common law
rules governing workplace accident compensation Minnesota House of Represen-
tatives (1909, 29-30) and MnSFL (1909, 20).
Letters between the Labor and Industries Department and Minnesota em-
ployers show conclusively that the Department took its responsibility of investigat-
ing accidents in the state very seriously. A clipping department within the Depart-
ment scoured the state's newspapers looking for evidence of industrial accidents.
If they found a mention of the accident, without receiving notification from the
company, a letter of inquiry was generated. In some cases if a firm did not send
any information about accidents, an incredulous letter was sent out. For example,
on 29 September 1911 Labor Commissioner Houk sent a letter to the Parker and
Topping Foundry asking "Can it be possible that no accidents have occurred in
that length of time [year ending 31 July 1911] to the people in the employ of said
company?" See Minnesota Department of Labor and Industries, Insurance Com-
pensation Correspondence.
Although Gillette (1911c, 174, 180) worried about "the danger of injecting
a paternalistic and socialistic feature" into the workers' compensation system,
he believed that "laws properly framed and intending to do equal justice will prob-
ably do more good than breaking down of precedents will do harm." As the presi-
dent of the MEA, Gillette saw accident reduction as one of the motivating factors
producing the mutual cooperation between employers and their workers. As the
spokesman for labor interests, McEwen (1911, 168) stood on relatively conserva-
tive ground by today's standards: "True progress will consist in the equilibriumThe Political Process of Adopting Workers' Compensation 145
between obtaining the greatest benefits for the largest number of injured work-
ingmen and affecting the least injury to industry." "You must never kill the goose
that lays the golden egg; don't do anything to injure capital," McEwen warned
Minnesota's workers. See Minnesota House of Representatives (1909, 15) and
MnSFL (1910, 22).
Speaking before the Minnesota Academy of Social Sciences in December
1910, Gillette (191 lc, 175) indicated the fractionalization occurring within the
commission and set the tone for the debate to occur in the 1911 legislature: "My
own conclusion ...is that it will be impossible to frame an act in a fair degree
satisfactory to the employers and providing reasonably adequate compensation to
injured employes or they dependents......See also Minneapolis Journal, 3 Decem-
ber 1910.
See Gillette (191 lb) for his view of how the Gillette bill differed from that
of his colleagues. See also Minneapolis Journal, 12 and 17 February 1911, and
Labor World, 24 February 1911. F G. Winston, the "head of one of the largest
railroad and stripping [sic] contract concerns in the west," argued that a one hun-
dred dollar medical allowance would "create a class of 'ambulance-chasing physi-
cians' to take the place of lawyers." See Minneapolis Journal, 24 February 1911.
See also Minneapolis Journal, 1 February 1911.
Minneapolis Journal, 2 April 1911.
MEA, 14 December 1911.
Labor World, 4 March 1911; MnSFL (1909, 21); and Minneapolis Journal, 5
February 1911.
Labor World, 25 March 1911.
Labor World, 8 February 1911, and Minneapolis Journal, 23 February 1911.
Minneapolis Journal, 24 February 1911.
MEA, 2 and 16 August 1912, and Minneapolis Journal, 14 October 1912.
Minneapolis Journal, 1 December 1912. Reports from William E. Stubbs,
secretary of New Jersey's Employers' Liability Commission, heartened labor lead-
ers. Stubbs concluded that his state's law was functioning relatively smoothly as 94
percent of the workers entitled to benefits were receiving them. See letter from
Stubbs to Houk, 21 March 1912, in Minnesota Department of Labor and Indus-
tries, Insurance Compensation Correspondence.
Minneapolis Journal, 14 October 1912.
Minneapolis Journal, 3, 8, and 31 December 1912; Labor World, 28 Decem-
ber 1912 and 18 January 1913; Minnesota Union Advocate, 10 January 1913; and
MnSFL (1913, 36, 67-68). See also MEA, 2 December 1912.
Labor World, 18 January 1913, and MnSFL (1913, 68).
Labor World, 19 April 1913; MnSFL (1913, 36-37); and Railroad Brother-
hoods (1912-1913, 22). The Minneapolis Journal, 10 April 1913, made the same
plea to its readers: "... pass the bill and get the system started. It can be perfected
better after it is in operation than by laying aside the whole matter for another
two years, while the extremists on both sides quarrel about terms."
MnSFL (1913, 19).
Labor World, 15 March 1915.
Labor Review, 11 and 18 April 1913.
Labor Review, 14 March 1913. For a summary of the internal fight within
the labor movement, see Lawson (1955, 217).
MEA, 28 February 1913. See also Labor World, 1 March 1913.
MEA, 17 March 1913 and 7 April 1913.
MnSFL (1913, 19); Minneapolis Journal, 4 April 1913; and Minnesota Sen-
ate Journal (1913, 1 156--61).146Chapter 5
Labor World, 19 April 1913.
Biographical information on Lundeen is from Minnesota Secretary of State
(1913, 664).
Minneapolis Journal, 12 April 1913.
50 Minnesota House of Representatives Journal (1913, 1624-31) and Minneap-
olis Journal, 12 April 1913.
Minnesota House of Representatives Journal (1913, 1630-31). The Senate
did not agree to the House's amendments and a conference committee was orga-
nized. Of the two most important amendments that the House enacted, the House
agreed to recede from the retroactive benefits for injuries lasting longer than thirty
days and a revised medical benefits amendment was written. Instead of providing
workers with a maximum of $195 in medical benefits over an extended time period,
the new amendment provided up to $100 during the first ninety days of the injury,
but the courts could order an additional $100 of medical benefits. See Minnesota
Senate Journal(1913, 1649-53).
Labor Review, 25 April 1913.
MnSFL (1913, 36; 1914, 27).
For more details on this process, see Kantor and Fishback (1998).
MnSFL (1913, 68).
For more details and statistical analysis of the adoption process in Missouri,
see Kantor and Fishback (1994a).
Rube T. Wood of the MoSFL claimed that the monopolistic insurance and
no maximum payment limit was insisted upon by the SLBTC (St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, 29 April 1919). The SLBTC's opposition to private insurance is best
summarized in statements made by Maurice Cassidy, the Secretary of the SLBTC:
"Inexperienced persons who would be entitled to compensation will have to deal
with trained insurance claim agents, whose reputations for dishonorable dealings
are world-wide. After they brow-beat the claimants into accepting what they have
to offer, these claim-adjusters, posing as the employers, will get the claimant to
sign the settlement papers" (Trades Council Union News, 29 October 1920). For
the MoSFL's views regarding how state insurance cut transactions costs, see
MoSFL (1918).
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 29 April 1919.
After the petition was filed, the Missouri Secretary of State, MoSFL presi-
dent R. T. Wood, other labor leaders, insurance men, and corporation lawyers who
favored the new law instituted court proceedings in the Jefferson City Circuit
Court to have the referendum set aside. The lower court sustained their motion.
However, the referendum supporters appealed to the state supreme court, which
reversed the lower court and ordered the referendum to proceed (MBLS 1918-
1920, 892).
The workers' compensation law was supported by the Republican candidate
Hyde, who won the election (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 31 October 1930). The Re-
publicans also achieved the "impossible," their first majority in the Senate (Kansas
City Star, 4 November 1920).
Kansas City Star, 6 November 1922; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 25 March 1921.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 6 November 1922, and Trades Council Union News,
13 October 1922.
Associated Industries of Missouri, Bulletin Nos. 150, 169, 185.
Kansas had a weekly maximum of fifteen dollars, while Illinois' weekly max-
imum was fourteen dollars (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1926b, 23, 26). Clark's
view on the issue is supported by statistical analysis of the referendum voting. See
Kantor and Fishback (1994a, 276-87).The Political Process of Adopting Workers' Compensation147
Associated Industries of Missouri, Bulletin Nos. 191 and 197.
Associated Industries of Missouri, Bulletin No. 177.
See Clark (1925, 602); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 29 October 1924; and Kansas
City Star, 2 November 1924.
Views on the probability of ever passing a workers' compensation law varied
widely at the beginning of 1925. A state labor official saw no reason why a work-
able workers' compensation law could not be enacted. On the other hand, the
Monthly Labor Review received reports that the difference of opinion over the na-
ture of the bill was so great that it would be difficult to agree upon a measure to
get sufficient support for passage (Clark 1925, 602).